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FROM CHECKLISTS TO DESIGN PROCESS 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS: INITIAL FRAMING 
Ergo Pikas1, Lauri Koskela2, Josef Oehmen3, and Bhargav Dave4 
ABSTRACT 
Building project delivery is beset with many long-standing problems. Often, these 
problems, resulting in failures of facilities and cost-time overruns, are directly related to 
poor design and design management practices. This motivated the definition of the main 
aim to develop an initial framing for the design process support systems, incorporating 
ideas from the human error and performance management domains, and on checklists. In 
this conceptual paper, a literature review method is used. It is suggested that cognitive 
systems engineering could be used to conceptualize the designers work and to incorporate 
checklists into the design process. Then, key aspects and elements for the development of 
design process support systems are addressed.  
KEYWORDS 
Error management, checklist, design process, design support systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Problems and accidents plague the delivery of construction projects. According to 
(Eurostat 2018), out of 3,876 fatal accidents at work in the 28 EU countries during 2015, 
21% took place in the construction sector. Many accidents have been directly or indirectly 
related to the design factors. (Behm 2005) analyzed 224 fatal construction accidents from 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fatality Assessment 
Control and Evaluation (FACE) database and found that 42% of the accidents were 
associated with design factors.  
Design errors have been considered the primary “contributor to building and 
infrastructure failures as well as project time and cost overruns” (Lopez et al. 2010). In the 
construction industry, checklists in the form of, for example, schedules (although not 
usually viewed as a checklist), templates, and review guidelines for organizing and 
managing the design activity have been used. These instruments have been theorized 
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mainly from the managerial or organization perspectives but not necessarily from the 
human error and performance perspective.  
In this paper, the aim is to develop an initial framing for the design process support 
systems based on the theoretical and the practical ideas and concepts related to human error 
and performance management and the use of checklists in aviation and design domains. 
Literature review method is used to clarify the underpinning ideas. Overall, this paper is 
divided into two major parts. In the second part, key aspects of the design support systems 
are discussed: product versus process-based support systems, central objects, and elements 
of support systems, process monitoring and the role of checklists in support systems. 
HUMAN ERROR AND CHECKLISTS 
In this section, the philosophy, approaches, and types of human error management are 
addressed first, and checklists devised in different industries to address human error and 
performance are addressed second. Finally, the main points are discussed. 
HUMAN ERROR AND HUMAN ERROR MANAGEMENT 
In 1935, at Wright Air Field in Dayton, Ohio, the US Army Corps held a competition that 
was supposed to be a formality to select the military’s next-generation bomber. However, 
Boeing’s Model 299, which was seen to be superior, crashed in a blazing explosion, killing 
two of the five crew members. The investigation revealed that the crash was caused by a 
‘pilot error’ (Gawande 2010). The solution to the problem was not the redesign of the 
airplane or more training, but a simple pilot’s checklist.  
Furthermore, since the chemical plant explosion in Flixborough (1974), the failure of 
the second nuclear reactor on Three Mile Island (1979), and the explosion of the reactor’s 
core in Chernobyl (1986), human errors and organizational failures have become to be 
considered as the primary contributors to accidents (Reason 1990). Nowadays, research on 
human error can be found in several disciplines, including construction (Behm 2005; 
Saurin et al. 2008).  
Philosophy of Human Error 
The philosophers (Gorovitz and MacIntyre 1975) addressed the nature of human fallibility 
and described two sources for “why humans fail in what they set out to do in the real 
world”. The first source is the necessary fallibility: humans are not omniscient. In 
productive goal-directed activities, there are always particulars of a situation that cannot 
be reduced to the law-like generalizations and initial conditions. Even the best possible 
judgment can turn out to be erroneous (Gorovitz and MacIntyre 1975). The second source 
is the ineptitude, or human error, with the various degrees of seriousness, caused by the 
failure to apply existing knowledge (Gorovitz and MacIntyre 1975).   
(Senders and Moray 1991) defined the human error as a deviation from intention, desire 
or expectations, from something that was "not intended by the actor; not desired by a set 
of rules or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its acceptable limits". 
However, this definition has limited value in the context of design, where ends and means, 
as well as the design process, are mutually dependent and in constant flux. Furthermore, 
creativity is at the core of designing, involving routine and non-routine, subject- and object-
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oriented activities (Love 2002). This implies that in design, it is rather difficult to 
distinguish between the erroneous and successful activity. (Woods et al. 1994) argued that 
ascribing “error to the actions of some person, team, or organization is fundamentally a 
social and psychological process”.  
Similarly, (Hollnagel and Amalberti 2001) argued that the dichotomization of human 
activity either ‘correct’ or ‘error’ is an oversimplification of a complex phenomenon. 
Instead of looking for “human errors” as either causes or events, human errors need to be 
considered as part of the normal range of human performance with various degrees of 
variability. Particularly, (Hollnagel and Amalberti 2001) proposed that management 
should “[…] find where performance may vary, how it may vary, and how the variations 
may be detected and – eventually – controlled”. Also, to find out why and how things go 
right and amplify it. 
Due to the complex nature of design (Lindemann et al. 2009), design activity being 
subject to uncertainties, tradeoffs, and emergencies, amplified by time pressure, irregular 
demand, and overcrowding, there will be a gap between ‘work-as-imagined’ (e.g., by 
managers who dictate procedures) and ‘work-as-done’ (Wachs and Saurin 2018). That is, 
actual work situations do not comply with pre-defined plans and procedures. According to 
(Suchman 1987), plans and procedures, as well as social and material environments, are 
better framed as “resources for action”. A design agent and designing cannot be isolated 
from their context (Ullman 2002). 
Approaches to Error Management 
(Reason 1990) argued that there are two approaches for human error management: (1) the 
person approach and (2) the system approach. The person and system approaches subscribe 
to different views of error causation and philosophies of error management, and thus, have 
different practical implications.  
In the person approach, the focus is on individual errors. However, according to 
(Reason 2000), the person approach has a significant limitation: focusing on individuals 
isolates errors from their context, which leads to the failure to identify the common 
patterns. In the system approach, in addition to human errors, the focus is on the 
environmental conditions of human work and the development of means to avert errors or 
mitigate their effects. It is assumed that humans are fallible and errors will occur. However, 
these errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, with their origin in systemic 
factors, “[including] recurrent error traps and organizational processes that give rise to 
them” (Reason 2000).  
A more recent approach, named cognitive systems engineering, has been adopted to 
describe and analyze complex man-machine ensembles (Hollnagel and Woods 2005). A 
cognitive system is defined as “an adaptive system which functions using knowledge about 
itself and the environment in the planning and modification of actions” (Hollnagel and 
Woods 1999). In cognitive systems engineering, instead of operating on the level of 
physical or physiological, the focus is on the level of cognitive functions (Woods and 
Hollnagel 2006). That is, the emphasis is on the “joint cognitive systems, where human-
machine are treated as interacting cognitive systems” (Hollnagel and Woods 2005). These 
interactions between the human (cognition) and its environment, including social, material 
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and cognitive structures (such as conceptual symbolic artefacts; e.g., building information 
modelling), and how agents regulate and control their behavior and performance are the 
object of study and unit of analysis, respectively.    
Artefacts, either tools or prosthesis, form a central constituent in the joint cognitive 
systems (Hollnagel 2002). According to (Hollnagel and Woods 2005), the artefact is  
“something made for a specific purpose”. The distinction, whether the artefact is a tool or 
prosthesis, is dependent on the way it is used. That is, whether it is developed to enhance 
the user’s abilities to perform tasks and solve problems (e.g., design decision support 
systems) or replace certain functions (e.g., wheelchair).  
Levels of Cognitive Involvement and Types of Errors 
It is well established that human performance involves different levels of control, a central 
premise in activity theory (Bedny and Meister 2014). Several concepts and models for 
theorizing on human performance and control of behavior exist, such as the distinction 
between the micro-, macro-, and metacognition (Klein et al. 2003; Woods 2009). However, 
probably one the most well-known, due to its longevity, breadth of use, and success, is the 
Rasmussen’s Skill-Rules-Knowledge (S-R-K) model. It was initially proposed at the end 
of the 1970s and has served the human factors research community since (Woods 2009). 
However, the S-R-K model developed based on the information processing view of 
cognition, pioneered by Newell and Simon, has been criticized in the cognitive systems 
engineering domain (Hollnagel 2002; Hollnagel and Woods 2005). The main criticism is 
that it isolates the human cognition from its environment (social, material and cognitive 
structures). Consequently, the overall system perspective was somewhat lost. In cognitive 
systems engineering, to overcome this limitation, the focus moved from internal functions 
and structures of human or machine to the external joint cognitive systems (Hollnagel 
2002).  
The different human performance levels have been associated with different types of 
errors. The development of an error taxonomy is the most common approach to 
transforming the theories of human error into a usable form (Senders and Moray 1991). 
(Reason 1990) proposed that the types of errors include slips, lapses, and mistakes. Slips 
refer to the attention failure of carrying out unintended or unplanned action(s) and lapses 
to the memory failure of omitting intended or planned actions. Mistakes are the result of 
using wrong rules, incorrect application of rules or failure to apply the correct rule; or the 
insufficient or incorrect knowledge or misapplication of existing knowledge to new 
situations. Finally, violations are deliberate deviations from standards, safe operating 
practices, and procedures (Reason 1990).  
CHECKLISTS IN HUMAN ERROR/PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
Various artefacts to avoid human error and assure the performance of designers have been 
developed, including checklists to increase the quality of outcomes and to reduce the risk 
of costly mistakes. For example, human error management and pilot’s checklists are 
arguably the cornerstones of operational aviation safety. Although checklists might look 
simple, they are complex socio-technical interventions and need to be designed, developed 
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and implemented consciously (Gawande 2010). In the following, the theoretical and the 
practical ideas and concepts related to the use of checklists are addressed. 
General Concepts on Checklists  
(Scriven 2000) defined the checklist as “a list of factors, properties, aspects, components, 
criteria, tasks, or dimensions, the presence or amount of which are to be separately 
considered, in order to perform a certain task”. Unlike, for example, lessons learned, which 
tend to be descriptive, checklists by definition are prescriptive. That is, checklists constitute 
‘actionable’ knowledge (Kokkoniemi 2006). “Checklists [guide] a user and act as 
verification after completion of a task, without necessarily leading users to a specific 
conclusion” (Ćatić and Malmqvist 2013). According to (Scriven 2000), checklists have the 
following benefits: help to reduce errors of omission; are relatively easy to understand and 
validate; reduce human biases (‘halo effect’ and ‘Rorschach effect’); reduce the problem 
of double weighting in evaluative tasks; and help to capture and transfer knowledge. 
The primary objectives of using checklists include error reduction or best practice 
adherence, standing anywhere in-between an informal cognitive aid (memory recall) and a 
protocol (standardization and regulation of processes or methodologies) (Hales and 
Pronovost 2006). (Scriven 2000) distinguished between five types of checklists: Arbitrary 
(e.g., simple shopping checklist), sequential, weakly sequential (for psychological or 
efficiency reasons), partly or entirely iterative (e.g., problem-solving flowcharts) and 
diagnostic (e.g., decision-trees) checklists. Different types of checklists support certain 
levels of human performance and problem-solving. In the following, the examples of 
instantiation of checklists in aviation and product development are briefly reviewed. 
Checklists in Aviation  
In aviation, checklists under most circumstances are considered a mandatory part of the 
practice. Checklists are the flight protocols that all pilots are required to use before, during, 
and after flights. Completing a checklist from memory is considered a violation or error 
(Helmreich 2000). The two categories of checklists used in the cockpit include (Clay-
Williams and Colligan 2015): normal and non-normal (or emergency) checklists.  
Normal checklists are used as part of a regular flight practice to ensure that all necessary 
has been done (Degani and Wiener 1993), especially when the list of tasks is long to be 
accessed from memory and tasks are subject to interruptions. The typical normal checklists 
include preflight, cockpit, starting engine, landing, and shutdown checks (Hales and 
Pronovost 2006). Normal checklists have two types of execution strategies (Degani and 
Wiener 1993): (1) Do-verify, where the task is performed from memory first and then 
verified against the checklist (used in contexts with limited time); and (2) Call-Do-
Respond, where tasks are divided between two or three pilots for calling, performing or 
verifying procedures. Both methods include at least action and verification steps (Hales 
and Pronovost 2006).  
Non-normal (emergency) checklists, not part of the normal flight protocol, are used to 
guide the correction of error situations and may include checks for ground operation 
emergencies, take-off emergencies, landing emergencies, and fuel system failures (Hales 
and Pronovost 2006). Emergency checklists may contain boldface, non-
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boldface or flowchart items, selected by the aircraft manufacturer depending on the likely 
severity of the problem and time available to solve it (Clay-Williams and Colligan 2015). 
Boldface items require immediate action, often executed from memory. Non-
boldface checklists are used when the time is not critical. Checklists may also be 
instantiated as a flow chart or decision three (Clay-Williams and Colligan 2015).  
Furthermore, checklists for airplane maintenance and pilots’ physical, mental, and 
emotional status evaluation before a flight have been developed (Hales and Pronovost 
2006). In recent decades, aircraft manufacturers have transitioned from paper-based to 
electronic checklist systems to guide pilots through both normal and emergency 
procedures. Electronic checklists have helped to reduce errors further when compared to 
the paper-based checklists (Boorman 2001).   
Checklists in Product Development 
In product development, errors cause cost and time problems and poor quality of products. 
Moreover, errors can cause safety issues for producers as well as for product users. 
Standardized procedures and checklists as a common strategy have been used to manage 
errors (Hales and Pronovost 2006). As Masaki Imai stated in his seminal work, there can 
be no kaizen (continuous improvement) without standardization (Imai 1996). Checklists 
can be used as the means to implement and improve standards. In the following, as Toyota 
has been considered one of the leading companies in process standardization and 
implementation of checklists, the focus will be mainly on the Toyota product development 
system. 
(Ward et al. 1995) argued that the second Toyota paradox, the first paradox being the 
Toyota Production System, is the set-based concurrent engineering: “[…] delaying 
decisions, communicating ambiguously, and pursuing an excessive number of prototypes, 
enables Toyota to design better cars faster and cheaper”. (Sobek and Liker 1998) described 
six organizational and managerial mechanisms underlying the second Toyota’s paradox, 
including mutual adjustment, close supervision and integrative leadership as the social 
processes, and the standard skills, standard work practices and design standards as the 
means of standardization. Authors emphasize that these mechanisms are only useful when 
applied together. 
Contrary to the US car manufacturers, Toyota has successfully standardized much of 
its development process (Sobek and Liker 1998). They have achieved it by carefully 
balancing the standardization of simplified work plans (“often fit on a single sheet”) and 
the flexibility of the process concept implementation in each vehicle program. The 
simplicity and flexibility help to develop “common understanding, and continuous 
improvement, while hard deadlines keep the project on track” (Sobek and Liker 1998). The 
product and standard development processes are always considered and designed together. 
Standard work plans are developed, implemented and updated by the designers and 
departments that use them.  
At Toyota, engineering checklists (“lessons learned books”) are used by each 
participant to identify and record feasible design regions based on the current capabilities 
of the organization (Ward et al. 1995). Engineering checklists are highly visual and part or 
process specific for transferring experiences between vehicle programs (Morgan and Liker 
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2006). Engineering checklists comprise detailed information related to the aspects of, for 
example, functionality, manufacturability, government regulations, and reliability (Sobek 
and Liker 1998). Checklists also contain items on what can be done or not in an economic 
sense or items for incorporating new technologies for automation, cost reduction, quality 
improvement and so on (Morgan and Liker 2006). Checklists are used throughout the 
design process and particularly for design reviews. At the beginning of a new vehicle 
program, engineering teams exchange checklists to update each other on what is possible 
or not. In this way, assumptions are to be avoided. 
According to (Sobek and Liker 1998), team members come to the review meetings with 
a prepared checklist of items they need to verify, and identified discrepancies between the 
checklists and designs become the points of discussion. When something new based on 
experience, analysis, experimentation, and testing is learned, it is added to the checklist. 
As such, checklists are continuously updated and become the means to explicate and 
transfer the accumulating knowledge of product development. The constant revision and 
updating of checklists, as part of the designers’ work, also helps to develop a sense of 
ownership (Morgan and Liker 2006).  
At Toyota, checklists are perceived to have the following benefits (Sobek and Liker 
1998): improve face-to-face meetings, add predictability, facilitate organizational learning 
across vehicle programs, and make the knowledge to reside in the organization. Similar 
benefits have been recognized in other related domains, including the software engineering 
industry and engineering design in general.  
In software engineering, although checklists have been mainly used for the inception 
processes of identifying defects and requirements engineering, (Kokkoniemi 2002) argued 
that checklists could also be used as part of the organizational memory system. Checklists 
can function as an experience-knowledge collection, experience-knowledge transferring 
and software process development tools (Kokkoniemi 2006). Similarly, according to 
(Firesmith 2005), checklists can support the software teams to make the state of the art the 
state of the practice by actually implementing the best known methods, techniques and 
knowledge.  
The design of complex artefacts requires intensive knowledge-based activities to be 
carried out. For example, the questions-based approach has been proposed in engineering 
design literature. (Ahmed and Wallace 2001) proposed that questions-based design support 
system can aid novice designers to understand what they need to know in any given design 
context. (Grebici et al. 2009) developed five sets of generic questions that could guide the 
designers’ inquiry into the subject matter. (Winkelmann and Hacker 2010) demonstrated 
that the use of interrogative questions stimulated reflection on solutions, which led to a 
significant improvement of the final solutions. 
Common Characteristics of Checklists 
Based on the literature review, checklists have been developed, implemented and 
maintained from three different perspectives: error reduction (Gawande 2010), 
process/performance (production) improvement (Ahmed and Wallace 2001; Grebici et al. 
2009; Sobek and Liker 1998; Winkelmann and Hacker 2010) and knowledge management 
(Kokkoniemi 2006; Sobek and Liker 1998).  
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Benefits across the industries addressed above, include the error and human bias 
reduction (i.e., slips, lapses and mistakes); increased awareness of issues/aspects (e.g., 
safety issues); increased quality of services and products; improved team cohesion, 
communication and coordination; safer use of equipment and instruments; support for 
organizational learning.  
The most elementary function of all checklists is that they are mnemonic devices (i.e., 
memory aids). Other functions of checklists depend on the use situation. In aviation, 
checklists for normal and non-normal (emergencies) situations have been developed. In the 
normal situation, the primary function of checklists is to avoid errors of omission and 
assure a best practice adherence (important for continuous improvement). In emergencies, 
checklists are used to support situation diagnosis and problem-solving. In the product 
development, checklists have been used to facilitate communication, coordination and 
team performance; to support quality improvement; and to provide the organizational 
memory system. 
Five types of checklists for different use situations and functions have been proposed 
in the literature, including the arbitrary, sequential, weakly sequential (for psychological 
or efficiency reasons), partly or entirely iterative (e.g., problem-solving flowcharts) and 
diagnostic (e.g., decision-trees) checklists. Two common execution strategies include the 
“call-do-respond” and “do-verify”. Checklists are often paper-based, but electronic 
checklists are used as well (Hales and Pronovost 2006).  
Different studies have emphasized that checklists are complex interventions and require 
careful design, development, and updating. These studies have argued that the most 
challenging aspect of implementing checklists is to convince the users to implement and 
maintain checklists (Hales and Pronovost 2006). (Degani and Wiener 1993) argued that it 
is also important to consider human factors design principles for designing and 
implementing checklists. 
DISCUSSION 
Design is a complex human activity subject to the opportunity of errors, resulting in costly 
mistakes. However, instead of focusing on individual mistakes, the focus should be on the 
system level, including in addition to the individual also the context. Joint cognitive 
systems approach describes human performance as the product of multi-layered activity. 
Human performance control involves multiple concurrent phases and modes of control. 
Different levels of performance are associated with different types of error, including slip, 
lapse, mistake, and violation.  
Cognitive systems engineering seems useful for developing interventions for 
incorporating checklists into the daily work of designers. Different modes of human 
performance control, extending from reflective (interpretative) to reactive modes of action 
control, require the use of different types of checklists. Nowadays, as is the case in the 
aviation industry, it is also common to integrate the checklists into the artefacts for aiding 
human operators.  
Checklists could also be conceptualized from the three views of production 
(management) proposed by (Koskela 2000). Checklists encoding standardized work 
procedures can help to reduce process variation, thus, waste (e.g., the seven preconditions 
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for the task and the seven wastes can be considered as checklists). Furthermore, checklists, 
when used for error reduction can help to improve quality, thus, value to the customer. 
Checklists as simple ‘to-do’ lists can define the necessary tasks to design an artefact, or 
part of the artefact 
Before discussing the possibilities for developing support systems, it must be noted that 
human error management has roots in quality management (Shewhart 1931), although the 
term “human error” was not explicitly used there. Specifically, the approaches proposed 
by (Reason 1990) and Hollnagel and Amalberti (2001) overlap with ideas advocated in the 
quality management domain. Indeed, some of the main components of the Toyota error 
management include, for example, the mistake-proofing (‘poka-yoke’) and visual 
management (Shingo 1986; Ward et al. 1995).  
DESIGN PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
The need for a systematic error and performance management has also been recognized in 
the building design context (Lopez et al. 2010). Inspired by the use of (electronic) 
checklists in the aviation industry, in this section, the main concepts relevant for developing 
a design (process) support system are addressed. The proposal relies on the premise that 
building designers use building information modelling (BIM). 
DESIGN SUPPORT SYSTEM OR DESIGN PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEM  
(Ullman 2002) proposed the idea of ‘ideal mechanical engineering design support system’. 
However, the focus was on the artefact, the inner conceptualization of technical parts 
(functions and structures) of the design application. However, the performance of building 
designer is the product of interactions between the designer and the environment, including 
artefacts one uses to perform goal-oriented tasks.  
Instead of focusing on the principles of product and their implementation in the product 
design applications, the focus should be, not neglecting the product view, on the process 
of design. That is, the design is primarily concerned with interactions involving human(s), 
object(s) and contexts together with the general aim of bringing about changes that are 
enabled and mediated by the situated subject (addresses interpretation) and object oriented 
(addresses causality) activities (Pikas 2019).  
CONSTITUENTS OF DESIGN PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
In the domain of building design, the main objects include the context(s) (problem domain 
(global and local) and solution domain), humans (clients, users, and designers), and objects 
(product, BIM and checklists). These are embodied in the design process, which itself 
contains the following elements (Pikas 2019): modes of activity (analysis and synthesis), 
the categories of design activities (subject- and object-oriented), stages and phases, causal 
structure of design transformations (problem and solution state changes), iterations, and 
mental and external activities. This means that the contexts, humans, and objects of design 
are brought together through the design process.  
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DESIGN PROCESS MONITORING 
The effective control of the design process requires close monitoring of the design process 
and providing information back to designers and design managers. But there are limitations 
with the typical approaches (Yarmohammadi and Castro-Lacouture 2018). Often, the daily 
process monitoring is left to the sole responsibility of individual designers, which may lead 
to conflicting activities and decisions. In the managerial context, due to the manual 
processes of collecting data, there is a considerable monitoring lag between the actual 
design process and feedback (Pikas 2019). 
For the design process support system, a real-time design process monitoring system 
needs to be developed (e.g., a plugin for Revit could be developed). Although the focus in 
this study was on the measurement of outputs (model elements), and not taking into account 
contextual matters and designers activities, the feasibility of this has been already studied 
(Yarmohammadi and Castro-Lacouture 2018). The real-time monitoring of the design 
process could be then used to integrate the checklists into the daily work of designers.  
CHECKLISTS FOR DESIGN PROCESS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Checklists are not a new invention in the building design context. However, checklists have 
been used relatively narrowly, mostly for design reviews and inspections; e.g., the design 
review checklists of the Whole Building Design Guide (Prowler and Vierra 2012) or 
(Sannwald 2009). Furthermore, clash detection, say by Solibri, and automated code 
checking, are in a way automated checklists (Sacks et al. 2018). These types of checklists 
are primarily focused on the static aspects of design, i.e., design outputs.  
Also, the process needs to be taken into account, and checklists for these need to be 
developed, be they manual or computerized. Furthermore, the two issues of developing 
checklists for building design include the development of the substance (contents) of 
checklists, and developing the media (channels) to deliver them to the point of use. The 
context-aware design process support system would help to automate the detection of a 
relevant checklist, and relevant item on that list, and assure compliance to the standards. 
CONCLUSION 
An initial framing for design process support systems was developed in this study. The 
purpose of a design process support system would be to facilitate the error, performance 
and knowledge management; needed because design as a complex activity is prone to 
errors. Cognitive engineering systems together with the process perspective of design can 
facilitate the theoretical development framework for design process support systems. If the 
processes of BIM-enabled design can be monitored, then checklists could be incorporated 
into the design process to standardize work, facilitate communication and coordination, 
improve quality, and enable knowledge transfer between projects.  
However, as this is only an initial framing, many aspects of the design process support 
systems still need to be addressed. For example, in this work, there was no room to 
specifically address the content and relationships between the different constituents of 
design process support systems. Also, how exactly the monitoring of designers work can 
be done and what kind of analytics (probably something along the lines of process mining) 
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is required to make sense of the raw data. Similarly, the kinds of visualizations needed to 
communicate the checklists in real time to designers at work are also significant. All these 
are important questions and need further study. 
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